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Local authorities in the United Kingdom are required to ‘lead’ multi-agency humanitarian 
responses to major disasters. Concerns mounted in the late twentieth century that responses 
to people bereaved in the immediate aftermath of such events at best failed to meet their 
needs and at worst compounded their distress. Subsequent reviews and reforms reframed 
some victim needs as ‘rights’ and established legal, administrative, and practice frameworks 
to improve matters. Local authority ‘crisis support’, provided in partnership with other 
actors, lies at the heart of the UK’s contemporary emergency response to the bereaved. 
Drawing on primary research on the development and deployment of crisis support in a local 
authority, and while acknowledging incident- and context-related challenges, this paper 
considers the significance of challenges with their origins in organisational factors . Recent 
developments within and between responders may exacerbate these challenges. This paper 
argues, therefore, that further research into such developments is necessary. 
 
Introduction 
In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, officials recover and identify the dead, conduct post-
mortems, gather, collate and disseminate casualty information, arrange body viewings, 
provide support, conduct investigations, and manage the media. Such actions can amount to a 
bewildering array of interventions for bereaved and survivors. Consequently, the sensitive 
provision of advocacy, guidance, and information, and the meeting of social needs, are 
essential elements of crisis support. Good practice is about orientating victims, helping them 
to ‘get their bearings’. 
 
This paper considers difficulties in providing ‘crisis support’ to disaster-bereaved people in 
the immediate aftermath of acute disasters in the UK. After briefly reprising victims’ 
experiences in the late twentieth century, recent reforms are outlined. While acknowledging 
the issues raised respectively by incident characteristics on the one hand and wider social 
contexts, especially regarding social sense-making politics of blame, on the other, the study 
asserts that key difficulties can lie in organisational factors among and between responders 
 2 
 
themselves. Drawing on primary research of crisis support in a UK local authority, principal 
organisational challenges are discussed with secondary references examples drawn from 
further afield. The paper suggests that appreciation of these factors is essential to 
understanding how responses are shaped. Notwithstanding recent reforms, changes within 
and between primary responders raise significant questions from for   uture responses. 
 
Victim experience and emergency management reform 
Psychosocial preparation was practically non-existent for the string of disasters that struck the 
UK from the mid-1980s (Hodgkinson and Stewart, 1991). After the bombing of Pan Am 
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21 December 1988 responses lacked coordination. 
Furthermore, while bereaved relatives were required to give distressing personal descriptions 
on multiple occasions, they were denied the information that they needed (Davis and Scraton, 
1997). Families were prevented from viewing the deceased and visits to disaster sites were 
discouraged. The local authority filled indentations made by falling bodies only to discover 
that some families wished to see these sites in their original condition. The move to launder 
recovered clothing similarly failed to anticipate that some relatives would want belongings 
returned unsanitised. 
 
Following the Hillsborough stadium disaster on 15 April 1989 the bereaved underwent ‘an 
inhumane and damaging process of identification’, queuing through the night before viewing 
displays of poor-quality photographs of the dead (Scraton, 2007). The deceased (96 
supporters of Liverpool Football Club) were then presented in body bags for identification 
before being quickly reclaimed. Questioning took the form of hostile interrogation as police 
began, in parallel, a forceful campaign to blame the victims for the disaster (Scraton, 1999, 
2007).  
 
Support was similarly cursory four months later when the Marchioness pleasure cruiser sank 
on the River Thames in London after being hit by the Bowbelle dredger. Relatives were not 
permitted to view the dead or informed of post-mortems, and later it emerged that the hands 
of 25 of the 51 people who drowned on the night of 20 August 1989 had been secretly 
severed to facilitate fingerprinting  (Clarke, 2001).  
 
After the shootings at Dunblane Primary School in Scotland on 13 March 1996, relatives of 
the 16 children and 1 teacher who lost their lives suffered delays in obtaining information, 
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official misinformation, and were held in the same room as staff who had been prohibited 
from passing on what they knew, despite the fact that guidance and practice had been updated 
(Cullen, 1996; Scraton, 2007).  
 
Across these disasters, misinformation was common, access to the dead was denied or 
managed oppressively, access to disaster sites was obstructed, and, after the Marchioness 
incident, the dead were secretly mutilated. Even in the light of the trying conditions 
associated with disasters, the victims were failed (Davis and Scraton, 1999).  
 
Alongside these experiences, other factors added impetus towards change. First, political 
discourse increasingly reified the experiences of victims (Rock, 2004; Goodey, 2005). 
Second, the profile of disaster victimisation was heightened by almost instantaneous media 
representations. Traditional and new media platforms combined with the widespread 
availability of cameras and telephones to offer multiple windows on suffering. Third, trauma 
discourses differentiated traumatic loss from ‘ordinary’ bereavement, contributing to the 
establishment of specialist disaster services (Davis, 1999).  
 
Early intervention was seen as necessary now to prevent distress becoming ‘disorder’. In 
response to the demands of disaster campaigners, the Labour Party government, elected in 
1997, set up three inquiries into aspects of the Marchioness sinking and safety on the River 
Thames. One considered concerns about the response to the tragedy. Lord Justice Anthony 
Clarke (2001) found that denial of access to the deceased and the disfigurement of bodies 
probably violated Article 8 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. He 
recommended four principles for response: (i) the provision of accurate and honest 
information; (ii) respect for the deceased and the bereaved; (iii) ‘a sympathetic and caring 
approach’; and (iv) ‘the avoidance of mistaken information’ (Clarke, 2001, p.114). Whilst 
confirming the central role of local authority social services, he commended the emergence of 
the police Family Liaison Officer (FLO), consolidating a direct role for the police in 
psychosocial response.  
 
Meanwhile, other potential and actual crises, including fears about the Y2K ‘millennium 
bug’, fuel protests, and Foot and Mouth Disease, provided additional momentum towards 
reform. A review of emergency planning, set up in February 2001, was accelerated by the 
terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 (O’Brien and Read, 2005). The 
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Civil Contingencies Act 2004 echoed Clarke’s principles and established statutory duties for 
potential responders, with planning and training to be coordinated through local and regional 
resilience forums. Three features of the detailed guidance that have followed the Act are 
important here. First, there is a fundamental concern with coordination, with agencies 
‘combin[ing] and act[ing] as a single authoritative focus . . . consult[ing], agree[ing] and 
decid[ing] on key issues; and issu[ing] instructions, policies and guidance to which all . . . 
will conform’ (Cabinet Office, 2005, p. 8). In the field, co-working is expected in all key 
emergency centres.  
 
Second, local authorities remain responsible for coordinating care and for meeting victim 
needs (HM Government, 2006). Local authority ‘crisis support’ teams (CSTs), it is suggested 
(HM Government, 2006, p. 26), might assist in:  
 
 clarifying procedures and processes, keeping people informed, and letting them know 
the roles of the agencies involved; 
 explaining common reactions to crisis and stress and helping to identify where 
specialist help is required; 
 ‘signposting’ other support and services available in the community, helping people to 
access them, and assisting with form-filling; and 
 fulfilling a listening role. 
 
Third, the real ‘lead’ agency in the field is still the police. Its pre-eminence remains grounded 
in extensive powers and responsibilities. Officers usually chair Local Resilience Forums, 
established on the basis of police boundaries and to which all local authorities are not 
required to send representatives (Cabinet Office, 2005). During responses the police control 
disaster sites, coordinate searches, collect evidence, process casualty information, and 
identify bodies on behalf of the coroner. They may also enforce evacuations, as well as 
oversee criminal investigations, facilitate other enquiries, and assume roles in emergency 
centres. These responsibilities require, and attract, extensive resources. To consider just 
victim liaison, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) was able to make 350 FLOs available 
after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004. By 2007, some 1,100 MPS officers had 
received family liaison training.1 
                                                          
1 Author’s interviews with Metropolitan Police Officers, London, 2007. 
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The Clarke Report, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and the associated guidance were 
major developments. What had only recently become recognised as legitimate ‘needs’ now 
became ‘rights’ and legal duties and reformed administrative structures now framed 
emergency planning. However, guidance and procedural reform do not secure effective 
change. General guidance frequently is difficult to ‘fit’ with the specific. Reforms can 
generate new problems or simply reshape older ones. Tensions, for example, are likely to 
remain between investigative/security agencies and psychosocial priorities, albeit dispersed 
more widely (within the police, and between the police, as well as among local authorities 
and corporate and third-sector responders ). Reforms also can fail to confront some important 
issues, such as the implications of the instrumentalisation and deskilling of, and the decline 
in, humanitarian social work in the UK, issues that have given rise to significant concern 
among social work scholars.  
 
Understanding difficulties in disaster response 
There are many continua along which acute disasters may vary. It simplifies matters here to 
consider three sets of challenges facing acute disaster support. The first set has its roots in the 
location, scale, and nature of the incidents themselves. The second set arises from the social 
contexts within which disasters originate, impact, and attract a response. The third set—over 
which responders have the most direct influence—involves organisational factors within and 
between responders themselves. Before looking at this latter issue in detail, it is necessary 
briefly to recognise the importance of the first two sets of challenges. 
 
Primary challenges: location, scale and nature of incidents 
Whatever the level of preparedness and organisational resilience, disasters, by their nature, 
present three key sets of difficulties to responders. First, locations may be inaccessible, 
extensive, or hazardous. For instance, the bodies of the 852 people who lost their lives in the 
sinking of the Estonia car and passenger ferry on 28 September 1994 were at the bottom of 
the Baltic Sea, and the bodies of the 259 passengers and crew members who died in the 
Lockerbie bombing were scattered across 850 square miles of countryside. Sometimes 
uncertainty remains even as to the number of fatalities, not least because sites may be 
dangerous. As workers attended a suicide bombing in Jerusalem on December 1st, 2001, 
another bomb exploded some 50 metres away (Perliger, Pedahzur, and Zalmanovitch, 2005). 
After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York City on 11 September 
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2001, ‘Ground Zero’ remained hazardous (Kupferman, 2003; Tucker, 2004), owing, for 
example, to increased quantities of potentially hazardous contaminants in the dust and debris. 
Simply put, such circumstances will inevitably present severe tests to operations. 
 
Second, the scale of the disaster often is overwhelming, sometimes damaging the response 
capacity itself. The 11 September 2001 attacks destroyed New York’s Emergency Operations 
Center; 63 civilian police workers from Stockholm, Sweden, and 23 social service personnel 
died aboard Estonia; and the scale of Hurricane Katrina (August 2005) was such that 
approximately 950,000 applicants were deemed eligible for disaster assistance a year after the 
event and some 100,000 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) travel trailers 
were still in use (Norris and Rosen, 2009). Large-scale disasters may see the deployment of 
undertrained or inexperienced staff. The Hillsborough disaster, for example saw a call for 
volunteers within the social services department. . Indeed the sheer scale of some events and 
the urgency of victims’ needs may make such deployments inevitable: there just will not be 
sufficient numbers of fully disaster-trained helpers immediately available. For instance, more 
than 500 Swedish nationals  died in the 2004 tsunami and some 30,000 others were in the 
zone  (Lennquist, 2004a). Even when the site is small, disaster communities can extend 
widely, and those affected may ‘feel very isolated and very vulnerable’ (Johnston and 
Beeson, 1993, p. 71). Support for victims as they return home may be minimal and based on 
scant understanding (Johnston and Beeson, 1993, p. 71). Evacuees may be as likely to 
encounter suspicion and hostility as compassion (Settles and Lindsay, 2011).  
 
Third, the nature of incidents can compound distress. Relatives today expect the dead to be 
recovered, identified, and treated respectfully (Stoney at al., 2011). Yet, bodies may be 
irrecoverable, destroyed, or damaged. Collecting, collating, and identifying human remains 
require painstaking work. Modern technology has greatly improved the possibility of accurate 
identification but it requires time, during which waiting relatives will need considerable 
support.  
 
Secondary challenges: social contexts, sense making and blame 
Official discourse has little to say about the politics of victimisation. In fact, primary 
victimisation in a disaster can be exacerbated by social hostility and injustice. Victims often 
raise uncomfortable questions. The fragility and unfairness of life and the behaviour of 
people in extremity can be difficult to accept. Denigration of victims or the denial of their 
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accounts sometimes protect a belief that life is fair and help to maintain dominant beliefs in 
the face of countervailing evidence (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Correia and Vala, 2003). 
Moreover, sense-making develops within specific pre-existing popular, professional, and 
official discourses and, ‘given that there is a social distribution of interests, motives and 
knowledge . . . is inherently political’ (Gephart, 1984, p. 213). Victimisation is commonly 
interpreted using frames of ‘deservingness’ within which even victims of ‘natural’ disasters 
can be condemned (Taylor, 1999; Lukes, 2005).  
 
Hours after 58 Chinese ‘clandestines’2 were found suffocated in a lorry container at the UK 
port of Dover on 18 June 2000, parliamentary exchanges paid only minimal, condolences 
before moving quickly on to border security, with which, it was presumably judged, the 
electorate would be more concerned (BBC News, 2000). Even where victims themselves are 
not perceived as wholly to blame ‘accountability for these people’s victimization tends to rest 
with other immigrants and foreigners in the migration chain, and stops short of blaming 
citizens of countries whose demands for immigrants’ cheap services . . . are a reason for their 
presence in “our” country’ (Goodey, 2005, p. 231). 
 
Prejudices towards some populations verge on hatred. If migrants can expect scant sympathy, 
prisoners can expect still less. When 355 inmates died in a fire at the National Penitentiary in 
Comayagua, Honduras, on 14–15 February 2012, readers of the Daily Mail took the trouble 
to make their views clear on news comment boards (Moran, 2012):  
 
Well I only hope there were no innocents among these criminals.  
 
If you can’t do the time DON’T DO THE CRIME! 
 
If they had been in bare cells with bread and water this would not have happened. 
  
If there had to be a fire somewhere in the world, I hate to say it, but a prison is the best 
place. Save the innocent first. 
 
                                                          
2 This term suddenly appeared in official speech, designed seemingly to insinuate the possible illegal immigration status of 
the victims at a time when this had yet to be established. The tragedy occurred during a period of rising political concern in 
the UK with ‘bogus asylum seekers’. 
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There are examples from around the world in which constructions of victims as the ‘other’ 
are institutionalised. After Hurricane Katrina struck the south of the US in August 2005, 
newscasters condemned a mass, ‘animalistic’ frenzy, precisely ‘continuous’ with what many 
Americans had been persuaded to believe about poor black African-Americans (Frymer, 
Strolovitch, and Warren, 2005: Gilman, 2005). Emergency assignments were refused out of 
fear (Davis, 2006) of ‘combat operations . . . underway on the streets’ (The Army Times, cited 
in Dynes and Rodriguez, 2005, p. 2). With tens of thousands awaiting food, water, and 
rescue, officials set up a temporary centre to book criminals (Kaufman, 2005).  
 
Denigrated victims may be individuals held to have made mistakes, such as pilots, drivers, 
captains, or crew. Popular bifurcation may not recognise that the blameworthy may be 
victims too. More broadly, disaster victims may be members of groups held up for social 
opprobrium: the criminalised; ‘hooligans’; migrants; protestors; or members of communities 
accused of supporting terrorism. Official guidance, technocratic in tone, understates the 
politics of heterogeneous victimisation, the marginalisation of some victim groups, and the 
potential ambivalence of their relationship to the state and vice versa. Nor can officials 
simply be assumed to be above such processes. The Mayor of New Orleans, Ray Nagin, told 
US talk-show host Oprah Winfrey that ‘“hundreds of armed gang members” were raping 
women and committing murder in the Superdome’ with occupants ‘“in an almost animalistic 
state”’ (Davis, 2006, p. 248). The New Orleans Chief of Police, Eddie Compass, told Oprah 
Winfrey that ‘we had little babies in there getting raped’ (Davis, 2006, p. 248). After 
Hillsborough, the ‘recollections’ of police officers were altered to remove criticisms of the 
force itself, but with ‘no corresponding removal of criticism of the fans’ (Stuart-Smith, cited 
in Scraton, 1999, p. 191). Public relations strategies aim to minimise and deflect blame, if 
necessary on to the victims. 
 
Tertiary challenges: organisational issues in response 
Although crisis support teams may not be entirely impotent before the unforeseeable 
specificities of incident and context, they can influence the organisational factors that will 
determine the speed, efficiency, and appropriateness of the response to such contingencies. 
Few needs are entirely unpredictable. The bereaved—the prime focus of UK local authority 
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crisis support teams—will need information, for example, which can go well beyond 
confirmation of death. One bereaved father explained:3 
 
you are thinking, ‘did she cry out? . . . did she feel the pain?’. . . . ‘Did she want her mum 
and dad? Was she scared? Was there time to be scared?’ Somehow . . . you want . . . to 
experience as much of what she experienced as possible. 
 
Needs such as these clearly may never be met (Eyre, 2002). Moreover, even in the case of 
more straightforward information, the circumstances of rescue may make detailed recording 
difficult and uncertainty frequently is the rule (Fennell, 1988, p. 160). The general need of 
bereaved people (and others) for information, though, should come as no surprise and should 
be an obvious focus of disaster preparation. Experience suggests, however, that problems 
within and between agencies often prevent the fulfilment of information needs. Where 
disasters ‘threaten elites by highlighting policy failures’, authorities may be strongly 
motivated to deny, suppress or distort inconvenient perspectives (Birkland, 2004, p. 181). 
The French heatwave disaster of summer 2003, which resulted in thousands of deaths across 
the country, was at first denied by authorities whose agenda was ‘reassurance’ (Lagadec, 
2004). After Hillsborough police officers were instructed not to record events in their 
notebooks as part of a ‘reconstitution of truth’ (Scraton, 2007, p. 80). Following the events of 
11 September 2001, official impetus towards a speedy return to ‘business as usual’ denigrated 
concerns about the serious health risks around Ground Zero (Kupferman, 2003).  
 
Another primary need, or even right, of bereaved relatives is to see the deceased (Clarke, 
2001). In cases where the recovery and identification of a body are protracted processes, 
family and friends may require considerable support. ‘Linking objects’, such as place and 
personal effects, also becomes important here. This is likely to be an enduring experience and 
once the critical moments have passed they cannot be reclaimed.  
 
But these are difficult times for responders too, and a range of organisational factors militate 
in favour or against successful crisis support. It is to such issues that this paper now turns, 
discussed in reference to the experiences of a humanitarian support emergency response 
group operating as part of a UK local authority. Between 2007 and 2010, 44 in-depth 
interviews were conducted with local authority and other personnel and intra- and inter-
                                                          
3 Personal interview with the author, Worcestershire, UK. May 1st 1998. 
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agency meetings were observed. In addition, the author was able to draw on numerous 
informal conversations about local authority emergency response and its challenges, and 
departmental and team documents also were examined. Key issues and themes were then 
coded and compared. Draft findings were circulated for accuracy, clarification, and 
discussion, and in some cases were amended accordingly.  
 
Objectives and methodology 
The aims of the research were to consider whether and how failures in services for bereaved 
people after UK disasters had been addressed at the level of local humanitarian responders 
and to understand the problems facing such a response from the perspective of those in the 
field. While managers and workers reflected on deployment at more than 30 incidents, the 
research was narrowed to examine in detail responses to three of the larger incidents, 
evaluated here as case studies: 
 
 Incident 1 was the drowning of shoreline workers trapped by rising tides. It involved 
multiple fatalities and survivors. Many of these were migrant workers. Crisis support 
workers (CSWs) provided shelter and physical and emotional support to survivors and 
bereaved. The incident was complicated by conflicting priorities between 
investigative, immigration, health, and support agencies.  
 Incident 2, the crashing of a helicopter servicing offshore gas platforms involved 
several fatalities and there were no survivors. CSWs worked jointly with police FLOs 
to support families in their homes and during their visits to the Family and Friends 
Centre established during the event. 
 Incident 3, the derailment of a passenger train involved the intervention of CSWs in 
an incident resulting in one fatality and more than 100 survivors, as part of a joint 
response between local authorities and various public and private providers.  
 
Data on the team’s experiences in these and other situations were considered in relation to 
five main themes derived from the literature: (i) planning and preparation; (ii) resources and 
capacity; (iii) organisational flexibility; (iv) the quality of inter-organisational relationships; 
and (v) the degree of continuity of crisis support work in relation to pre-emergency work, a 
theme running through each of the first four points. It is in relation to these themes that the 
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experiences of the respective crisis support teams, and the broader issues raised, are discussed 
below. 
 
Planning and preparation 
Specific emergency plans were viewed by CSWs and their managers with considerable 
caution. According to one manager, the Emergency Planning Team ‘have to tick boxes as far 
as plans are concerned. [But] it does not matter what the plan says. . . . Whenever an incident 
happens you never lift a plan and read it anyway and most of the incidents we have had don't 
fit the plan’. 
 
Incident responses originated in pre-planned ‘call out’ sequences but they developed flexibly 
rather than along the lines of pre-determined plans. ‘You have to prepare but you can't be 
prescriptive’, as another senior manager put it, ‘because each incident is different’. These 
views, widely echoed, chime with observations in the literature. These warn, in turn, that 
disasters cut across the local jurisdictions within which plans are framed and that plans edit 
out uncertainties, depicting partial or distorted data as if it were precise (Smithson, 1990; 
Blanco, Lewko, and Gillingham, 1996; Smallman and Weir, 1999). Perry (2004, p. 65) 
criticises ‘lengthy plans that attempt to anticipate every possible event and prescribe 
correctives’. Plans also may ‘miss’ people. Where language is technocratic and 
methodologies quantitative, ‘persons, communities and their concerns . . . [can be] . . . 
reduced to mass, collective units, statistically described data points, and functions of abstract 
dimensions’ (Hewitt, 1995, p. 321). Indeed, it has been argued that overly-prescriptive plans 
allow organisations to avoid facing their real unpreparedness (Smithson, 1990). Horlick-
Jones (2005, p. 257, citing Nikolas Rose) suggests that ‘contingency’, a state of uncertainty 
about outcomes, has been supplanted by ‘a more recent, technical notion of “risk” . . . which 
has “brought the future into the present and made it calculable”’. Such ‘flawed certainty’ is 
ultimately exposed when ‘precisely the situation . . . occur[s] [that] has not been considered’ 
(Andersen, 2003, p. 130). This was the sentiment behind the comment of one experienced 
CSW that ‘incidents don’t read plans’. It is an important point in a field where over-
bureaucratisation often is rewarded (Lennquist, 2004b).  
 
Crisis support managers and workers distinguished between planning and preparation, 
highlighting the basic assumption that, although incident specificities may not have been 
foreseeable, this did not preclude anticipatory investment in worker skills, flexibility, and 
 12 
 
understanding. The establishment of a humanitarian Emergency Response Group4in the 
County had preceded the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and its associated guidance. The 
experiences of several key personnel in major disasters prior to assuming their current roles, 
rather than the new statute, provided the central motivation to its development. This was 
bolstered rather than initiated by the elevation of resilience among central government 
priorities  that occurred subsequently.  
 
A principal aspect of the group’s approach was on learning through responses to smaller-
scale incidents. This grew as a practical means of giving non-emergency service workers 
direct experience of emergency situations and of responses to them. Preparing for the ‘big 
one’ is difficult to sustain when large-scale incidents are relatively uncommon. As one 
manager underlined, ‘the problem [in terms of major incidents] is that you more than likely 
only get the experience once’. Knowledge was gained and skills were honed in responses to 
building collapses, fires, floods, landslides, and police sieges. These ‘low-profile’ responses 
crafted a core of workers who grew increasingly familiar with, and confident in, each other. 
 
Learning occurred between incidents and lessons were fed quickly into revised arrangements 
around, inter alia, call out, management capacity, and administrative support. Significant 
difficulties in relationships between local authority and police during Incident 1 led to the 
establishment of joint training and protocols between police FLOs and local authority 
CSWs— with clear improvement being evident by the time of Incident 2, two years later.  
 
Although senior management accorded preparation a progressively higher priority over the 
time frame, some difficulties persisted. First, not all potential (or, as it transpired, actual) 
responders participated in training or exercises. In two of the three case study incidents 
significant difficulties emerged in inter-agency relationships with ‘unfamiliar’ actors whose 
work had not been integrated into preparation. Second, problems arising from this were 
exacerbated by initial under-recognition of the potential for inter-agency conflict during 
responses. This was addressed after inter-agency difficulties during Incident 1, but only in so 
far as joint working between local authorities and the police was concerned. While relations 
                                                          
4 This Emergency Response Group included a wide range of volunteers, many of whom were concerned with planning for 
and operating rest and other centres. A smaller group of personnel within the group focussed on direct engagement with 
bereaved people. This was ‘crisis support’ work and it was these staff who were organised into ‘crisis support teams’.  
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between them improved dramatically across incidents, relationships with agencies that had 
not participated in preparation proved problematic. Third, the stress on attending small 
incidents came to rely on a relatively small group of workers. Managers called out workers 
whom they knew to be experienced and reliable, leaving others with few opportunities to 
develop their knowledge or skills, and threatening resilience in the face of larger incidents. 
  
Resources and capacity 
UK local authorities are usually expected to finance disaster response from contingency funds 
(HM Government, 2007). Central assistance typically applies only ‘after the authority has 
spent 0.2% of its revenue budget on eligible works in the financial year’ (HM Government, 
2007, p. 24) and predominantly to bad weather incidents. The overriding rule is that where 
there is already a programme financed by government expenditure, further spending will not 
be met. The assumption is that resources will be found at the local level. Public sector 
organisations, though, cannot easily find ‘spare’ capacity or relax their ‘everyday’ functions 
to deal with emergencies. Local authority social work, from where most crisis support 
volunteers are drawn, ordinarily experiences staff shortages, inadequate accommodation, 
poor information technology (IT), and increasing burdens (Social Work Task Force, 2009a). 
Preparing for remote contingencies does not seem pressing and relies heavily on a few 
motivated individuals (Smith, Lees, and Clymo, 2003). Local authorities, unsurprisingly in 
this context, have seen advantages in developing low cost models, relying on workers to 
volunteer in an emergency. 
 
While this system has resulted in some impressive responses to incidents, and although there 
is considerable evidence of skilled and committed engagement, it was approaching the limits 
of its capacity when confronting relatively large-scale incidents, such as Incidents 1 and 3 
where there were large numbers of survivors. Only a brief time-limited service in these cases 
was offered to victims and CSWs were expected to be back in their normal jobs quickly. Both 
bereaved and survivors were commonly referred elsewhere, especially if from outside the 
locality. The relatively small number of personnel who tended to be called upon in 
emergencies were overstretched. In Incident 2 the under-resourcing of management became a 
problem. This may have been related to the fact that it happened during a period of public 
holiday when supporting cover was thin.  More generally overstretch and, in some cases 
exhaustion were sometimes made worse by workers’ own high level of motivation and 
enthusiasm for their work. Those working peripatetically found themselves struggling to 
 14 
 
access basic accommodation and resources when called out. Administrative support during 
Incident 2, for instance, operated from the spare bedroom of an officer’s home. There were 
shortfalls in IT and a heavy reliance on other agencies’ facilities. Workers were not paid 
during their time off and sometimes had to keep on top of their ‘day jobs’ as they supported 
bereaved relatives. There was acknowledgement that larger incidents would have required the 
swift redeployment of significant resources from elsewhere in the system and there was 
concern that the relative ‘success’ of this low-cost approach to smaller events was, ironically, 
reinforcing a degree of complacency among senior managers that emergency planning was 
‘in hand’. The relatively few personnel called out to incidents also meant that experience 
tended to become concentrated, raising risks associated with staff absence or departure. In the 
view of some this was exacerbated by the distancing of this sort of work from that demanded 
in everyday social work. 
 
Organisational flexibility 
Bureaucracies are comfortable ‘work[ing] on stable data . . . their basic frameworks of 
reference are established rules, clear and fixed partitions of areas of competence and levels of 
responsibility, top-down dynamics and a programmed time frame’ (Lagadec, 2004, p. 162). 
The literature suggests that there often is an immediate drift away from the formal and 
familiar once incidents occur (Superamaniam and Dekker, 2003). Disasters undermine linear, 
centralised administration:  
 
Those at the top do not typically know what to do. In fact . . . a dissociation of knowledge 
and authority . . . creat[es] a paradox of power. People . . . either have the knowledge . . . 
(because they are there, locally, in the field but they lack the authority to decide in 
implementation), or people have the authority to do it (but then lack the knowledge) 
(Superamaniam and Dekker, 2003, p. 313). 
 
Procedures can become redundant and key resources may be disabled or destroyed. Agencies 
need to recognise the diversity, variety, and creativity that ‘chaos’ may offer (Browning and 
Shetler, 1992; Comfort, 2002; Sellnow, Seeger, and Ulmer, 2002). Variables that become 
important are the ability to improvise, a shared conception of the response system, and an 
ability to question, to understand the limits of knowledge, and to interact respectfully (Weick, 
1993). Flexibility requires trust in individuals and groups to act without close supervision 
(Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2006, p.215). Where established approaches are inadequate or 
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inappropriate, they should be discarded or amended (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld cited in 
Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003, p. 42). 
 
Improvisation involves groups ‘self-organising’ in ad hoc networks (Weick, Sutcliffe and 
Obstfeld, cited in Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003). Although research points first to the 
limitations of a centralised hierarchical response, people ‘often make their missions work 
anyway . . . despite the countervailing pressures of procedure and protocol’ (Superamaniam 
and Dekker, 2003, p. 313). They do so by taking charge, through ‘a process of mutual 
adjustment that involves a “flattening” or apparent disregard of formal hierarchy’ 
(Superamaniam and Dekker, 2003, p. 314). ‘Unprecedented action requires . . . a kind of 
panic of empathy that trumps organizational habit and individual postures’ (Molotch, 2006, p. 
2).  
 
The case studies contained significance evidence of flexibility, imagination, independence, 
and initiative. Practice was not entirely without hierarchy, but important decisions concerning 
the delivery of death notifications and adapting procedures for body viewing, for example, 
were taken in consultation with those in the field, or delegated to them. Senior managers 
came to value CSWs and were prepared to grant considerable autonomy and flexibility even 
to fairly ‘junior’ workers. When major incidents did arise, workers generally had previous 
experience of working together on minor incidents within the county, in minor evacuations 
for example and had become used both to each other and to acting in fairly flattened 
hierarchies in which lateral communication and initiative were valued. 
 
Two main problems arose in this context. The first was when the local authority ‘gave way’, 
in the view of the CSWs who had been involved in Incident 1, to the security priorities of 
other agencies (discussed in the following section). That is to say, workers and their 
managers regretted that they had been too flexible. The second pertained to bereaved relatives 
from outside of the area during Incident 2. Even as the latter arrived to view the deceased it 
was being impressed on the CSWs that responsibility for supporting them should be passed 
on as soon as possible. In the event, counter-arguments by the CSWs themselves were 
accepted and these families were supported while in the authority. For one CSW, however, ‘it 
was made very clear that . . . [He was not to] offer any follow-up support’. CSWs did not 
know what provision, if any, had been arranged for victims returning to their home 
authorities. The concern was that home services might not be sufficiently familiar with the 
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needs of the victims, including support via inquest and inquiry processes. Such concerns are 
reinforced by research evidencing victims’ poor experience of non-emergency services in 
cases of corporate killing (Snell and Tombs, 2011). 
 
Inter-organisational working  
‘Incident organisations’ are ‘temporary configuration[s] of otherwise disparate resources’ and 
communication and coordination are major challenges (Smith and Dowell, 2000, p. 1154). 
Agencies have different cultures, knowledge bases, priorities, procedures, resources, and 
technologies. Whatever a plan prescribes, agencies often act according to their own routines, 
interacting with others only when this is absolutely necessary (Berlin and Carlstrom, 2008). 
Coordination requires regular updating and re-familiarisation among organisations at multiple 
levels as breakdowns can be serious. After Incident 2, CSWs were denied access to hospital 
wards and local authority senior managers were barred from the hospital’s control room and 
had to work from a public waiting area instead. The implications of disbanding hospital 
social work teams—the traditional interface between a local authority and health providers—
were exposed only when an emergency occurred. 
 
In an era of regular organisational restructuring, and the fragmentation of provision, as one 
actor disappears, others appear, which may not have been included in emergency preparation. 
A private sector Incident Care Team (ICT) appeared unheralded on the scene during Incident 
3. While its apparently bottomless fund of resources encouraged CSW responders to engage 
positively, time was wasted orienting ICT personnel and integrating them into the response. 
There appeared to be a lack of understanding of the lead role of the local authority, the role of 
the police in securing the incident site as a crime scene, and the responsibilities of both in 
terms of confidential information. ICT assistance was welcomed, but the broader rationale 
behind such a deployment, as acknowledged by industry personnel themselves, was to protect 
the corporate image. This matter may become particularly sensitive when ICTs respond to 
incidents with origins in which the corporations are, or are perceived to be, complicit. The 
possibility is raised of officials scrambling for resources, dispensed by image-conscious 
corporate criminals. 
 
The enhanced role of the FLO, while signifying enhanced police concern for victims, is not 
unproblematic either. Lord Justice Clarke (2001) viewed the deployment of FLOs to the 
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scene of the Ladbroke Grove, London, train crash on 5 October 1999 [OK?] as model 
practice, yet according to the police’s own account:  
 
The FLOs were unsure of the role of social services, who were in turn equally unsure of 
the roles and functions of the FLOs. [Neither knew] . . . the counselling organisation 
nominated by the [train operating companies] (Harrison, 2000, p. 3). 
 
All of the actors saw ‘counselling’ as someone else’s role. Although agencies eventually 
‘came together’ social workers were ‘reluctant to initiate early contact with the families as 
they felt their role was unclear, and to an extent superceded [sic] by the role of the FLOs who 
had access to the resources provided by the [train operating companies]’ (Harrison, 2000, p. 
4). 
 
This was clearly not a happy operation. Police were unhappy about recording practices and 
what they perceived as some partner agencies’ reticence to treat what they were told by their 
service-users as potential evidence  (Harrison, 2000). In fact, evidence set before Lord Justice 
Clarke highlighted considerable role confusion. The function of the police, it is easy for 
health or welfare partners to forget, is primarily investigative. From the point of view of the 
police, as one officer explained, ‘there can be ‘no absolute guarantee of confidentiality’. The 
same officer noted debates within the force about the possibility of using FLOs as ‘cover’ for 
counter-terrorism officers. A key issue here is that post-incident organisational politics cannot 
be approached naively by those responsible for psychosocial support. Where support and 
security agencies are too close, victims who are apprehensive about the ‘authorities’ might be 
easily deterred from accessing support. Official interests and motives may be complicated 
further when responder agencies feature in controversies regarding blame. Public relations 
were important for the ICTs referred to above in Incident 3. Countering or deflecting 
criticism may seem vital to state agencies, too (Scraton, 1999). Police pressed the mother of 
one Marchioness victim to keep secret the severing of her deceased daughter’s hands on the 
grounds that this was a ‘one-off’ mistake and that disclosure would distress others (Davis and 
Scraton, 1997). The easy assumption of benevolent official neutrality lying at the heart of 
official discourse does not withstand scrutiny. The exposure during the Leveson Inquiry (into 
the culture, ethics, and practices of the UK press following the News International telephone 
hacking scandal) of deeply troubling relationships between media, police, and former police 
personnel, together with allegations of media surveillance of disaster victims, has deeply 
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troubling implications for all high-profile victims, as well as for those charged with their 
support.  
 
The virtues of coordination indeed, can be overemphasised. ‘Coordination’ may be read 
either as implying mutual agreement or as implying direction by one agency (Hills, 1994). 
‘Cosiness’, trading on ‘vagueness, ambiguity, non-specificity and even distortion’ can breed a 
reluctance to confront errors (Smithson, 1990, p. 225). At the ‘directive’ end of the scale, 
meanwhile, a lack of feedback can allow mistakes to develop unchecked. In either case, 
consensus can become authoritarian and emergency measures can become repressive 
(Alexander, 2002). In Incident 1, according to the CSWs and their managers, too much 
emphasis was placed on cooperation and not enough on the humanitarian priorities of the 
local authority itself. At one level, there was conflict concerning what might be thought of as 
fairly minor issues, such as issuing and recording individual cigarettes and bars of chocolate, 
which infantilised victims. As one CSW recalled: 
 
If [survivors] wanted a cigarette they had to have a police escort. Cigarettes could only be 
given out one at a time and you had to ask the police to go and supervise them . . . in case they 
did a runner. I don't think there was anywhere to run because they had no proper clothes. . . .  
They had no money at all. There were people on gates. I [gave] them three or four ‘fags’ at a 
time, I wasn’t bothered. . . . I thought [it] was controlling and I wasn’t there to control. 
 
At a more serious level, CSWs had to wrestle with the extreme reluctance of some survivors 
to engage with officials from their home country’s embassy. Survivors in Incident 1 were 
also said to have been held in ‘unofficial’ custody for three days while officials proceeded 
with investigations. This was a complex intervention: there were multiple fatalities and 
survivors with immediate psychosocial needs, but there were also official concerns about 
potential criminal and immigration offences. In short the survivors could be seen as victims 
of tragedy or potential criminals. In retrospect, CSW personnel argued, they should have 
done more to assert their priorities—of humanitarian assistance. That they did not, they put 
down to a combination of a lack of experience of the team at this time, the marginal and 
‘suspect’ status of some victims, and the heavy emphasis placed on cooperation in official 
guidance. Crisis support may sometimes need to focus less on ‘coordination’ and more on its 
role in a system of inter-agency checks and balances. 
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‘Continuity’ and crisis support work 
‘Continuity’ emphasises the importance of pre-disaster arrangements throughout impact and 
in the aftermath of the event (Dynes, 1994; Tierney, 2007; Henry, 2011). Disastrous harm 
does not stand apart from, or above, social arrangements. Rather, it is ‘closely connected to 
issues of social change and power played out at the micro- and macro-social levels’ (Henry, 
2011, p. 221). Although ‘continuity’ can be employed analytically, it is also used 
prescriptively, suggesting that responders should build ‘on everyday working practices’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2007, p. 7). As Dynes (1994, p. 150) states, ‘[t]he best predictor of 
[organisational] behaviour in emergencies is behaviour prior to the emergency’. Disasters are 
difficult enough without expecting organisations to act in radically new ways. In this context, 
extensive changes to the everyday purposes, forms, and methods of UK social work raise 
questions as to its role after a disaster. Social work certainly is in a serious crisis, at the heart 
of which lies the commodification and instrumentalisation of care (Blaug, 1995; Dominelli 
and Hoogvelt, 1996; Munro, 2004; Parton, 2008). ‘Care’ is now packaged and accessed 
through bureaucratised assessments applied in straitened financial settings. Management of 
‘risk’ and ‘care’ ties social workers to their keyboards (Social Work Task Force, 2009a, 
2009b) and underscores longstanding worries that ‘[social work’s] concern with . . . 
therapeutic work [and] with . . . adaptive responses to life situations has virtually 
disappeared’ (Dominelli and Hoogvelt, 1996, p. 46). Statutory work on child protection, 
disability, and mental health, together with ‘care management’ of those discharged from 
hospitals, consume social services. Bereavement rarely is a priority. The clear danger is that 
many responders will face needs beyond their regular experience and unamenable to normal, 
bureaucratised ways of working. After the Ladbroke Grove rail disaster, social workers 
declined to work with bereaved victims because they did not feel competent to do so 
(Harrison, 2000). 
 
In relation to the overall philosophy of crisis support across and between the major incidents 
observed, managers underscored ‘non-specialist’ skills and qualities: empathy, the ability to 
communicate, to quickly assess situations, prioritise and improvise in unfamiliar and 
unpredicted situations, for example. In this approach ‘transferrable’ skills, together with 
commitment, reliability, and willingness to attend training, rather than formally accredited 
professional qualifications in social work or previous experience with ‘trauma’, were the key 
desirables. Having said this, there was also a sense in which this philosophy was sometimes 
more rhetoric than reality: qualified social workers actually did assume most principal roles 
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during incidents. . Either way, both social work and non-social work colleagues had many 
opportunities to grasp ‘real’ experience through involvement in numerous small-scale 
incidents that interspersed the major incidents themselves Volunteers responded to 34 
incidents between 2004 and 2007. Thus, preparedness for large-scale incidents was enhanced 
by regular smaller-scale ‘crisis’ experience. ‘Continuity’ developed between these 
emergencies, albeit of different scales helping to offset the discontinuities that pertained 
between ‘normal’ and emergency roles. If experience developed cumulatively, though, it was 
notable that it tended to be the same individuals who tended to be called upon to respond in 
many of these smaller incidents. Attempts to introduce ‘new blood’ were made but there was 
a balance to be struck between this and the value of experience to response.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, however, continuity was easy to establish and maintain 
at inter-agency levels. A new, unforeseen responder appeared on the disaster scene during 
Incident 3, one unfamiliar with the overall response or with those responsible for its 
coordination. The financial resources that they brought to the response were quickly put to 
use, yet there were difficulties with having to achieve proper integration rapidly. While ICT 
personnel publicised the success of their intervention to others in the industry, emergency 
personnel were rather more ambivalent. Some suggested that the ICT found it difficult to 
comprehend that the incident did not ‘belong’ to the company. The refusal of the police to let 
staff on to the crime scene and their reluctance to hand over casualty lists were not 
understood to be so by the corporate responder. The integration of national or international 
private sector organisations into local preparations requires ongoing commitment at the local 
level. Public relations ‘rewards’ may be scant. Whether or not companies are willing to 
commit resources to collective and long-term preparation, under local authority leadership, 
remains unexplored.  
 
There were questions here as to whether or not the demands of planning and preparation were 
resourced realistically. A wide range of organisations might be caught up in an emergency, 
and linkages have to be renewed regularly. Yet, the local authority manager responsible for 
the humanitarian aspects of all three major emergency responses had to attend to preparation 
with only part-time administrative support. Coordinating planning, preparation, and response 
clearly is sometimes an extraordinarily difficult endeavour. ‘Success’ is dependent in large 
part on other organisations and their willingness to participate in emergency preparation. 
Where responders have been ‘out of the loop’—and the fragmentation of service provision 
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across health and social services may makes this increasingly likely—it may be too late to 
rectify this during a crisis. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
As flaws in the responses to disasters in the UK in the late twentieth century became evident, 
pressure for improvement mounted. Legislative reforms raised national and local 
expectations and established frameworks for their realisation. Unsurprisingly, these centred 
on preparation for major emergencies themselves, augmenting Clarke’s (2001) principles for 
response to victims and support for an enhanced FLO role with the confirmation of a local 
authority lead within a multi-agency approach.  
 
This paper has explored, at the local level, organisational issues in the delivery of services to 
disaster-bereaved people. The case studies generate questions rather than answers and the 
issues they raise can only be generalised with caution. It is not argued here that the 
experiences of one local authority should lead to policy review or change. However, the 
experience of CSWs and their managers suggests some areas worthy of further thought and 
research. These pertain to planning and preparation, resources and capacity, organisational 
flexibility, the quality of inter-organisational relationships, and the continuity of emergency 
and non-emergency tasks and conditions. 
 
The most interesting and innovative aspect of work to crisis support personnel themselves 
was joint training with other agencies. This was seen, with some justification as innovative 
and important. This was less interesting to the author however, than the grounding of major 
incident preparedness in regular experience of smaller incidents. In other authorities minor 
emergency incidents may have been left to the emergency services with occasional support 
from local non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In this county by contrast, the managers 
saw an opportunity both to provide an important service in and of itself, and an opportunity 
to practise arrangements for larger incidents should they arise.  
 
It was perhaps instructive that the longstanding and committed efforts to forge an effective 
crisis support response to both large and small incidents relied on a volunteer model in which 
personnel were unpaid, negotiating some time off in lieu for emergency work - if their 
everyday line manager was amenable. It was a model with fairly obvious limitations, not least 
its reliance on continuing goodwill. Since the research was completed in 2009, UK local 
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authorities have been in the frontline of severe budget cuts as part of government-driven 
‘austerity’. Although the attractions of a low-cost model for employers in such circumstances 
are obvious, it would be interesting to know whether goodwill among prospective volunteers 
has accompanied these economies. Putting such possibilities to one side, the fieldwork 
provided examples of financial stringency vis-à-vis the lack of adequate accommodation, 
equipment, and relief. Staff responded with initiative and flexibility. Protocols were 
sometimes set aside when necessary, decision-making was delegated, and experienced 
workers were trusted. One problem, indeed, was that once workers ‘proved’ themselves 
during incidents, they tended to be called out repeatedly, limiting the opportunities available 
to others and limiting the size of the ‘pool’ from which future responders might be drawn. 
 
The most serious issues that arose across incidents were inter-agency difficulties. First, 
notwithstanding the exhortation in guidance that agencies act with a ‘single authoritative 
focus’ (Cabinet Office, 2005, p. 8), the reality on the ground was sometimes sharply 
conflicting priorities. In Incident 1, these centred on the balance to be struck between security 
and investigation on the one hand and humanitarian assistance on the other. In Incident 3, the 
corporate mitigation of reputational damage came into play. In the latter case, no significant 
deleterious effects resulted, although one can envisage scenarios where they might. In the 
former instance problems remained unresolved throughout the intervention. In retrospect, the 
CSWs themselves felt that they had let down their service users owing to a lack of 
assertiveness. Second, problems arose when responders had not participated in emergency 
preparation. In the first place, the investment required if only in terms of time, at the level of 
coordination, and its regular renewal, on the one hand, and in terms of frontline workers 
training together on the other, is difficult to sell to management in an agency with pressing 
immediate demands. In the second place, more generally, public services have become 
subject to seemingly endless ‘reform’, restructuring, and fragmentation. The manager with 
overall responsibility for humanitarian emergency response in the County expressed 
frustration with the multiplication of health providers in recent years. This and the potential 
commercial barriers to transparency in their working relationships have yet to be researched 
adequately.  
 
Key here are continuities between arrangements and relationships before a major event and 
the way in which these play out during incidents themselves. The downside of the ‘continuity 
principle’ (Dynes, 1994) is that there is unlikely to be an easy escape during a crisis from pre-
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existing arrangements that are dysfunctional or lacking in legitimacy. Where agencies do not 
ordinarily come together cooperatively at the requisite levels they are unlikely to find it easy 
to do so in emergency. As social service provision is increasingly characterised by 
fragmentation, competition, and attendant social work bureaucratisation, one can expect 
emergency responses to bear similar characteristics. One emergency services manager 
considered the future of broader UK emergency response with concern: 
 
the next scandal will be about organisations which we commission to deliver services but 
which hide behind commercial confidentiality: private and third sector organisations . . . 
which have their own commercial interests and agendas, dip into integration when it suits 
them, and operate without effective governance, scrutiny and transparency.  
 
There has been scant research into the ‘on-the-ground’ realities of crisis support and its links 
with everyday practice in the UK. Taken together, the experiences of field workers and the 
contemporary pace of broader structural change suggest that this deficit needs to be 
addressed.  
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